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Abstract 
 In this note, we analyze the effects of intellectual property rights on the volatility of 
economic growth. Our analysis is motivated by the observation that the strengthening of patent 
protection and the increase in R&D in the US coincide with a reduction in growth volatility 
beginning in the mid 1980’s. To analyze this phenomenon, we develop an R&D-based growth 
model with aggregate uncertainty in the innovation process and apply the model to ask whether 
increasing patent strength and R&D can lead to a significant reduction in growth volatility. We 
find a small but non-negligible effect that explains no less than 10% of the observed reduction in 
growth volatility in the US.  
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1. Introduction 
In the early 1980’s, the strength of patent rights gradually increased in the US. For example, the 
Ginarte-Park index of patent rights increased from 3.83 in 1975 to 4.88 in 1995.1 After this 
patent reform, private R&D expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
US increased from 1.2% in 1980 to an average of 2.5% in recent time. Cross-country empirical 
studies, such as Varsakelis (2001), Kanwar and Evenson (2003) and Park (2005), employ the 
Ginarte-Park index to examine the effects of patent strength on R&D and innovation, and they 
generally find a positive and significant effect.2 As for the effects of technical progress on the 
volatility of economic growth, empirical studies, such as Tang (2002) and Tang et al. (2008), 
generally find a negative effect; in other words, technical progress reduces growth volatility. 
 In this note, we analyze the effects of patent policy on the volatility of economic growth 
through technical progress. Our analysis is motivated by the observation that the strengthening of 
patent rights and the increase in R&D in the US coincide with a reduction in growth volatility 
beginning in the mid 1980’s. To explore this issue, we develop an R&D-based growth model 
with aggregate uncertainty in the innovation process and apply the model to ask whether the 
strengthening of patent rights and the increase in R&D in the US can lead to a quantitatively 
significant reduction in growth volatility.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 presents the US time series of growth volatility measured by the coefficient of 
variation of annual growth in real GDP per capita and shows a well-known pattern that volatility 
                                                 
1 The Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number indicates stronger patent rights. See Ginarte and 
Park (1997) and Park (2008a) for a detailed discussion on the construction of this patent index. 
2 See for example Park (2008b) for a survey of this empirical literature. 
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of economic growth in the US fell overtime until the recent crisis.3 Specifically, the coefficient 
of variation decreased from 1.4 in the mid 1980’s to 0.78 in 2007. In the numerical analysis, we 
calibrate the R&D-based growth model to quantify the fraction of this volatility reduction that 
can be explained by the increase in R&D and the strengthening of patent protection in the US. In 
summary, we find a small but non-negligible effect that explains no less than 10% of the 
observed reduction in growth volatility in the US. 
Our study relates to the theoretical literature on growth and volatility. Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) analyze the effect of financial development 
on volatility and find that financial development can reduce aggregate volatility through financial 
diversification across firms. Koren and Tenreyro (2007a,b) consider technological diversification 
instead of financial diversification and show that technological progress improves diversification 
by increasing the number of input varieties that are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks. 
Leung et al. (2006) show that rent-seeking behaviors can also give rise to a negative effect of 
technical progress on growth volatility. Taking the negative growth-volatility relationship as a 
basic premise that is supported by empirical evidence,4 our study relates to this literature by 
showing that patent policy can be a useful policy instrument for reducing growth volatility. 
This study also relates to the literature on patent policy and economic growth. In this 
literature, one branch of studies analyzes the effects of patent length on growth,5 whereas another 
branch analyzes the growth effects of other patent levers, such as patent breadth, patentability 
                                                 
3 The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. This scale-invariant index is an 
appropriate measure for growth volatility because it is not affected by changes in the average growth rate overtime. 
4 See for example Ramey and Ramey (1995), Aghion and Banerjee (2005), Tang (2002) and Tang et al. (2008). 
5 See for example Judd (1985), Horowitz and Lai (1996), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003), Futagami and Iwaisako 
(2007), Chu (2010a), Chen and Iyigun (2011) and Fung et al. (2012). 
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requirement, intellectual appropriability, protection against imitation, and blocking patents.6 Our 
paper complements these studies by providing a novel growth-theoretic analysis on the effects of 
patent policy on the volatility of economic growth. 
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
defines the equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the effects of patent policy on growth volatility. The 
final section concludes with a discussion of the model. 
 
2. The model 
To provide a theoretical analysis on patent protection and growth volatility, we consider the 
quality-ladder growth model in Grossman and Helpman (1991). Specifically, we incorporate into 
the model mainly two features (a) patent breadth as in Li (2001) and (b) aggregate uncertainty in 
the innovation process. Given that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied, the familiar 
components of the model will be briefly described to conserve space while the new features will 
be described in more details below. 
 We consider a discrete-time model. At the beginning of each period, the accumulated 
level of aggregate technology is determined by R&D in previous periods. Given this level of 
aggregate technology for production, households supply labor while production firms and R&D 
entrepreneurs hire workers. At this stage, the R&D entrepreneurs hire workers based on their 
expected productivity for innovation. After final goods are produced, households consume the 
output. Finally, R&D productivity is realized, and the inventions created in this period contribute 
to the level of aggregate technology in the next period. 
 
                                                 
6 See for example Cozzi (2001), Li (2001), Kwan and Lai (2003), O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Cozzi and 
Spinesi (2006), Horii and Iwaisako (2007), Furukawa (2007, 2010), Chu (2009, 2010b, 2011), Chu and Furukawa 
(2011), Chu and Pan (2012), Chu and Peng (2011), Iwaisako and Futagami (2012), Sorek (2011) and Spinesi (2011). 
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 2.1. Households 
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a life-time utility function given by  
(1) 


 

0
00 )1(
ln
t
t
tcEU  , 
where 0  is the discount rate and tc  is consumption at time t. Each household maximizes (1) 
subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by ttttt cwara  )1(1 , where ta  is a state-
contingent asset owned by households and tr  is the rate of return. Each household inelastically 
supplies one unit of labor to earn a wage income tw . The familiar Euler equation is  
(2) 

 
 

1
11
1
11
t
t
t
t c
rE
c  . 
We use )]1(/[ 11   ttt cc  to denote the stochastic discount factor.  
 
 2.2. Final goods 
Final goods ty  for consumption are produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a 
unit continuum of differentiated intermediates goods )(ixt  for ]1,0[i  given by  
(3) 


 1
0
)(lnexp diixy tt . 
This sector is perfectly competitive, and the producers take the output and input prices as given. 
The familiar conditional demand function is )(/)( ipyix ttt  , where )(ipt  is the price of )(ixt . 
 
 2.3. Intermediate goods 
There is a continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[i  producing the differentiated intermediate 
goods. In each industry i, there is a temporary leader who holds a patent on the latest technology 
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in the industry and dominates the market until the arrival of the next innovation. The production 
function for the leader in industry i is 
(4) )()( ,
)( ilzix tx
in
t
t . 
)(, il tx  is the number of workers in industry i. 1z  is the exogenous step size of a productivity 
improvement. )(int  is the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry i 
as of time t. Given )(intz , the marginal cost of production for the leader in industry i is )(/ int tzw . 
As is standard in the literature, the current and former industry leaders engage in Bertrand 
competition,7 and the equilibrium pricing strategy for the current industry leader is a constant 
markup over the marginal cost given by  
(5) )(/),()( intt tzwbzip  , 
where bzbz ),(  for )1,0(b  that is the level of patent breadth.8 In Grossman and Helpman 
(1991), there is complete patent breadth against imitation such that 1b . Li (2001) generalizes 
the policy environment to allow for incomplete patent breadth )1,0(b  against imitation. Due to 
incomplete patent protection, the former industry leader’s productivity increases by a factor bz 1  
(i.e., her productivity becomes bininb tt zzz   )(1)(1 ) by imitating the current leader’s innovation. 
Therefore, the limit-pricing markup for the current industry leader is ),1( zzb  . For the rest of 
this study, we denote patent protection as ),( bz   and consider changes in   coming from 
changes in patent breadth b  only. A larger patent breadth increases   and monopolistic profit. 
 
                                                 
7 See Cozzi (2007) for an interesting discussion on the Arrow replacement effect. 
8 The level of patent breadth b can also be interpreted as the fraction of an invention that is protected by its patent. In 
reality, when an inventor applies for a patent to protect her invention, she makes a number of patent claims to be 
reviewed by a patent examiner. If the patent claims are too narrow or too specific, imitators may be able to imitate 
around them to avoid patent infringement. 
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 2.4. R&D 
There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[j . In each period t, they hire 
workers to create inventions to be implemented at time 1t . Entrepreneur j’s probability of 
successfully creating an invention is given by )()( , jlj trtt   , where t  denotes aggregate R&D 
productivity that is stochastic. To capture aggregate uncertainty in the innovation process in a 
tractable way, we assume that t  follows a Bernoulli distribution. With probability )1,0(p , a 
good state happens at time t such that tgt ,  . With probability p1 , a bad state happens such 
that tgtbt ,,   . 
To capture the volatility-reducing effect of technical progress, we follow Leung et al. 
(2006) to assume that  
(6)  )( ,, trtg lG , 
(7)  )( ,, trtb lB , 
where  djjll trtr )(,,  is aggregate R&D labor, and the parameter   captures R&D productivity. 
The spillover functions (.)G  and (.)B  in the good and bad states have the following properties: 
(a) 0(.)(.),  BG , (b) 0(.)(.),  BG , and finally (c) )()( ,, trtr lBlG   for any value of )1,0(, trl . 
The formulation in (6) and (7) introduces a positive R&D spillover effect into the model. The 
presence of positive R&D spillovers across firms is supported by empirical studies such as Jaffe 
(1986), Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1989) and Los and Verspagen (2000).9 For example, Jaffe 
(1986) estimates the elasticity of patents with respect to other firms’ R&D to be about 1.1 for an 
                                                 
9 On the one hand, the R&D-based growth literature usually assumes a negative intratemporal R&D spillover across 
firms to capture the patent-race and duplication effects; see, for example, Kortum (1993) and Jones (1995). On the 
other hand, motivated by the empirical evidence cited here, theoretical studies on R&D cooperation have long 
considered positive spillovers in partial-equilibrium models. Early studies in this literature include D’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992). See Chen and Chu (2010) for a general-equilibrium analysis of positive 
R&D spillovers in a quality-ladder growth model without aggregate uncertainty in the innovation process. 
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average R&D firm. To preview of our result, we will show that if and only if the spillover effect 
in the bad state is stronger than in the good state, then increasing R&D would reduce the 
volatility of economic growth. Because R&D also stimulates technical progress, this scenario is 
consistent with the empirical evidence for a negative growth-volatility relationship discussed in 
the introduction. 
Let )(ivt  denote the market value of the invention owned by the leader in industry i at 
time t (before the realization of R&D productivity). Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification in (3), 
the amount of flow profit is the same across industries (i.e. txtx i ,, )(    for ]1,0[i ). As a result, 
tt viv )(  for ]1,0[i  in a symmetric equilibrium that features an equal arrival rate of innovation 
across industries.10 The no-arbitrage condition for tv  is  
(8) ])1[( 11,  tttttxt vEv  . 
Equation (8) states that the asset value tv  is equal to the sum of the flow profit captured by this 
asset at time t and the expected present value of the asset at time 1t . t  is the probability (after 
the realization of R&D productivity at time t) that the next innovation occurs and takes away the 
market at time 1t . 
Given the above setup, the expected productivity of R&D labor is  
(9) )]()1()([][ ,, trtrtt
e
t lBplpGE   . 
The expected arrival rate of innovation for entrepreneur j is  
(10) )()]([)( , jljEj tr
e
ttt
e
t   . 
The expected profit for R&D entrepreneur j is 
                                                 
10 We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et al. (2007) 
for a theoretical justification for the symmetric equilibrium in the quality-ladder growth model. 
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(11) )()(][)( ,,11, jlwjlvEj trttrtttt
e
tr    . 
The free-entry condition in the R&D sector leads to zero expected profit such that  
(12) ttttt wvE   ][ 11  . 
This condition determines the allocation of labor between production and R&D.  
 
3. Decentralized equilibrium 
This section defines the equilibrium. The equilibrium is a sequence of prices 0)}(,,{ tttt iprw  and 
a sequence of allocations 0,, )}(),(),(,,{ ttrtxttt jlilixyc . Also, in each period,  
a. households choose }{ tc  to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraints taking },{ tt rw  
as given; 
b. competitive final-goods firms produce }{ ty  to maximize profit taking )}({ ipt  as given; 
c. industry leader ]1,0[i  produces )}({ ixt  and chooses )}(),({ , ilip txt  to maximize profit 
subject to the Bertrand competition taking }{ tw  as given; 
d. entrepreneur ]1,0[j  chooses )}({ , jl tr  to maximize expected profit taking }{ tw  as given;  
e. the market for final goods clears such that tt yc  ; 
f. the labor market clears such that 1,,  trtx ll . 
Following the standard approach in the literature, we consider the equilibrium in which 
the labor allocation is stationary (i.e., xtx ll ,  and rtr ll ,  for all t). Although the labor allocation 
is stationary, the economy grows along a stochastic growth path (due to aggregate uncertainty in 
the innovation process) rather than the usual balanced growth path. Using recursive substitution 
on (8), the value of an invention becomes  
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(13) 










   



 1
,
1
,1
1
, 1
11)1(
h
he
tx
h
htxktkt
h
k
ttxt Ev 
 . 
The second equality of (13) makes use of the following conditions. The profit share of output is 
 /)1(,  ttx c , so that thttxhtx cc // ,,   . Combining this condition with the stochastic 
discount factor implies htxhtxkt
h
k
)1/(,,
1
   . As for 

   )1( 11 kt
h
k
tE  , it can be shown 
that it conveniently simplifies to he )1(  , where reeet l   for all t. Then, (13) simplifies to 
)/()1(,
e
txtv   . Combining this condition and the stochastic discount factor yields  
(14) )/(][ ,11
e
txttt vE    . 
The production labor share is /txt clw  . Substituting these conditions into (12) yields  
(15) erx ll  /)1(  . 
Lemma 1 presents the condition that determines the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor. 
 
Lemma 1: The equilibrium allocation of R&D labor is determined by  
(16) 
)()1()(
/)1)(1(
. rr
rr lBplpG
ll 
 . 
Proof: Combine (9), (15) and the labor-market clearing condition 1 rx ll .□  
 
For the special case in which 1)()(  rr lBlG  for all values of rl  (i.e., no spillovers), (16) 
simplifies to the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor in the original Grossman-Helpman (1991) 
model. To ensure that equilibrium R&D labor is non-negative, we impose the following lower 
bound on the R&D productivity parameter  . 
 - 10 -
Condition R (R&D productivity):  
)0()1()0(
)1/(
. BppG 
  . 
This condition, which implies that the left-hand side (LHS) of (16) is strictly greater than the 
right-hand side (RHS) of (16) at 0rl , together with the fact that LHS < RHS at 1rl  ensures 
the existence of at least one intersection of LHS and RHS for )1,0(rl . LHS is decreasing in rl  
while RHS could be either increasing or decreasing in rl . If RHS is increasing in rl  for )1,0(rl , 
then the solution must be unique. Even if RHS is decreasing in rl  for )1,0(rl , Condition R is 
also sufficient for the solution of )1,0(rl  to be unique given that RHS is a convex function in 
rl  while the LHS is linear; see Figure 2 for an illustration.
11 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The equilibrium allocation of R&D labor has the usual properties of being increasing in 
the R&D productivity parameter   and decreasing in the discount rate  . Furthermore, either a 
higher probability that the good state happens or a larger patent breadth increases R&D labor by 
improving the incentives for R&D. Lemma 2 summarizes the positive effect of patent breadth on 
R&D labor. 
 
Lemma 2: Equilibrium R&D labor is increasing in the level of patent breadth. 
Proof: Differentiating the LHS of (16) shows that 0/  LHS . Given Condition R, the unique 
intersection of LHS and RHS must move to the right regardless of the slope of RHS.□  
 
                                                 
11 When Condition R fails to hold, it is possible for multiple equilibria to arise. In this case, one can show that the 
equilibrium with a larger R&D labor is the stable equilibrium with the same comparative statics as in Lemma 2. 
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4. Effects of patent breadth on growth volatility 
In this section, we analyze the effects of patent breadth and R&D on the volatility of economic 
growth. First, we derive the expected growth rate. Due to the Cobb-Douglas production function 
in (3), each industry i employs an equal number of production workers. Then, substituting (4) 
into (3) yields xtt lZy  , where the level of aggregate technology is defined as 
(17) 




  

1
0
1
0
lnexpln)(exp
t
s
stt zzdiinZ  . 
The second equality in (17) uses the law of large numbers implying that the average number of 
inventions occurred across industries is equal to its expected value. Using the log approximation 
xx  )1ln( , the growth rate of technology and output at time 1t  is approximately equal to 
(18) zlzZZg rttttt lnln)/ln( 11    . 
Therefore, the expected growth rate is  
(19) rrrr
e
tt llBplpGzzlgE )]()1()()[ln(ln][ 1   , 
which is increasing in rl  as in the Li (2001) model without aggregate uncertainty in innovation. 
 
Proposition 1: A larger patent breadth increases the expected growth rate. 
Proof: From Lemma 2, rl  is increasing in  . Then, from (19), ][ 1tt gE  is increasing in rl .□ 
 
Next, we derive the variance of the equilibrium growth rate given by 
(20) 22221 )()]()()[1()ln()ln)(var()var( rrrrtt llBlGppzzlg   . 
The coefficient of variation of the equilibrium growth rate is  
(21) )1(
)()1()(
)()(
][
)var(
1
1 pp
lBplpG
lBlG
gE
g
rr
rr
tt
t
g 






 . 
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Equation (21) implies that an increase in rl  reduces growth volatility if and only if the following 
condition holds. 
Condition V (volatility reduction): )(/)()(/)( rrrr lGlGlBlB   for any value of )1,0(rl . 
Given that the expected growth rate is monotonically increasing in rl , Condition V must hold in 
order for the model to deliver the empirically observed negative relationship between technical 
progress and growth volatility. Therefore, we assume that Condition V holds for the rest of our 
analysis. Under this condition, increasing R&D mitigates the fall in R&D productivity in the bad 
state sufficiently to decrease the variance of t . Proposition 2 summarizes this finding. 
 
Proposition 2: If and only if Condition V holds, then a larger patent breadth would reduce the 
volatility of economic growth. 
Proof: From Lemma 2, rl  is increasing in  . Then, differentiating g  in (21) shows that g  is 
decreasing in rl  if and only if Condition V holds.□ 
 
 4.1. A quantitative analysis 
In this section, we calibrate the model to investigate whether strengthening patent protection and 
increasing R&D can explain a significant fraction of the observed volatility reduction in the US. 
To facilitate this numerical analysis, we specify a functional form for   rr llG )(  and 
  rr llB )( , where the parameters )1,0(,   determine the degree of spillovers in the good 
and bad states, and ε is a scale parameter. There are eight structural parameters 
},,,,,,,{  pzb  in the model. First, we set the discount rate   to a standard value of 0.03. 
To calibrate the remaining parameters, we consider the following empirical moments in the US. 
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We set (a) the R&D share of GDP (i.e., trt ylw / ) in 1980 to 0.012, (b) the average innovation 
arrival rate e  to 0.17 based on the empirical estimate in Laitner and Stolyarov (2011),12 (c) the 
average productivity growth rate eg  to 0.01, and (d) the variation coefficient g  of the growth 
rate to 1.4. Furthermore, we consider a feasible range of values for },{  . Finally, we set ε to 
0.05, which is the smallest value under which Condition R holds. In our numerical analysis, we 
find that raising the value of ε would favor the model in explaining a larger fraction of the 
observed volatility reduction, so we intentionally choose a small value of ε. 
 In the US, R&D as a percentage of GDP increases from 1.2% in 1980 to 2.5% in recent 
time. Holding other calibrated parameter values constant, we increase the level of patent breadth 
b  such that trt ylw /  rises from 0.012 to 0.025. We find that this policy change reduces growth 
volatility g  and explains about 10% to 35% of the observed volatility reduction in Figure 1 (i.e., 
from 1.4 in the 1980’s to 0.78 in 2007). To be conservative, we consider the lower bound of 10% 
as our benchmark. 
β 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
z 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06
φ 65.3 55.6 52.1 50.1 48.7 47.8 47.1 46.6
p 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24
b 1980 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
b 2007 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
fraction 35.1% 27.0% 22.3% 18.8% 16.0% 13.6% 11.7% 10.0%
Table 1: Calibration results for γ = 0
 
Table 1 presents our benchmark results for 0 . The last row of Table 1 reports the 
fraction of the volatility reduction in Figure 1 that can be explained by the increase in R&D in 
the US. We see that as   decreases, the value of p  (that is needed for 4.1g ) decreases. 
                                                 
12 It is useful to note that considering a larger innovation-arrival rate of 0.33 as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) 
would not change our main results. 
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These smaller values of   and p  increase the fraction of the observed volatility reduction that 
can be explained by the model. For 6.0 , the model is unable to generate a value of 1.4 for 
g . In fact, as   approaches zero, g  approaches zero.  
β 0.90 0.95 1.00
z 1.06 1.06 1.06
φ 93.8 86.9 83.4
p 0.13 0.16 0.17
b 1980 0.24 0.24 0.24
b 2007 0.46 0.46 0.46
fraction 18.4% 14.3% 11.3%
Table 2: Calibration results for γ = 0.1
 
In Table 2, we examine the robustness of our results by considering a larger value of 
1.0 . In this case, we find that the model is able to explain a larger fraction of the observed 
volatility reduction for a given value of  ; however, the model is unable to generate a value of 
1.4 for g  when 85.0 . Intuitively, the difference between   and   must be sufficiently 
large in order for the model to deliver a significant degree of volatility. As   rises further, the 
model is able to explain an even larger fraction of the observed volatility reduction for a given 
value of  ; however, when   becomes sufficiently large, the model is unable to generate a 
value of 1.4 for g  even when 1 . 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this note, we have analyzed the effects of intellectual property rights on technical progress and 
growth volatility. In summary, strengthening patent protection improves the incentives for R&D 
and increases technical progress that in turn reduces the volatility of economic growth. Although 
the model features a reduced-form relationship between technical progress and growth volatility 
via a positive externality of R&D spillovers, we believe that this simple setup is appropriate for 
 - 15 -
our purpose for two reasons. First, our focus is on the effect of patent policy on growth volatility 
while taking the negative effect of technical progress on growth volatility as a basic premise that 
is supported by empirical evidence. Secondly, it is still an on-going debate as to the main channel 
through which technical progress reduces volatility; therefore, we adopt a reduced-form setup 
instead of taking a stand on which structural mechanism is empirically the most relevant.  
In this study, we have considered a stylized model, so that the numerical results should be 
viewed as illustrative. In reality, whether or not strengthening patent protection reduces growth 
volatility significantly depends on two channels: (a) patent policy has a significant and positive 
effect on technical progress, and (b) technical progress has a significant and negative effect on 
growth volatility. Existing empirical evidence seems to suggest that both of these channels are 
often present, especially among high-income countries.13 
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Figure 1: Growth volatility in the US
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Footnote: Figure 1 presents the 10-year rolling coefficient of variation of annual growth in real GDP per capita using 
data from the Penn World Table. 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium allocation of R&D labor 
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